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TRANSFORMING PUNISHMENT INTO COMPENSATION: 
IN THE SHADOW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
TOM BAKER* 
I have never had a case that settled and the defendant paid 
punitive damages. I don't think it exists. You go to mediation 
and you just know that you settle the case for the 
compensatories and the punitives get dropped. It's a condition. 
It never settles for punitive damages. 
- EE, Defense lawyer 
Punitive damages, the way you're speaking of them, are those 
highly stylized, exemplary damages that we talk about, but 
every good trial lawyer knows that punitive damages, you really 
build them into your compensatory damages anyway, by 
showing just short of intentional misconduct. . . . I think 
punitive damages exist in the manner in which you present the 
case. It's a punitive case if the conduct is egregious. 
-TN, Plaintiffs' lawyer 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to apocalyptic claims about the effect of tort law 's 
punitive damages remedy on the U.S. economy, sociolegal scholars have 
attempted in recent years to measure and describe the impact of punitive 
damages within the U.S . tort system. This research has been surprisingly 
difficult to do. Nevertheless, a picture is emerging from studies of trial 
verdicts that sharply contradicts the apocalyptic claims: neither the 
frequency nor the median size of punitive damages trial verdicts in tort 
cases has increased in dramatic fashion; and, in the two tort areas where 
there may have been significant, relative increases in size or 
frequency-products liability and medical malpractice-that increase 1s 
due to the fact that there were almost no punitive damages awards in 
* Connecticut Mutual Professor and Director, Insurance Law Center, University 
of Connecticut School of Law. Copyright, January 1997, Tom Baker. Thank you to 
Marc Galanter, Herbert Kritzer, Robert Rosen and James Stark for comments on an 
earlier draft. 
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those areas thirty years ago. 1 
In terms of trial verdicts, then, we can begin to say with some 
confidence that punitive damages awards are far from a dominant feature 
in tort practice. Punitive damages verdicts are relatively rare, and when 
they are obtained in a noncommercial tort case, the usual order of 
magnitude is in the tens of thousands of dollars, not the millions.2 But 
because most cases end in settlement, studies of trial verdicts provide at 
best an imperfect picture of tort practice. 3 Thus, notwithstanding the 
relative insignificance of punitive damages verdicts, it is possible that the 
"shadow" cast by punitive damages awards in the settlement process is 
much larger than would be predicted by simple extrapolation from trial 
verdicts. 
Measuring that shadow is fraught with difficulty. Unlike trial 
verdicts, settlements are not public information. The vast amounts of 
settlement data which have been assembled by insurance companies have 
not been subject to independent analysis comparable to the work on trial 
verdicts. Moreover, the interviews with the lawyers discussed in this 
Article suggest that measuring the shadow of punitive damages would be 
problematic even with access to insurance company data. 
Even in an egregious case, according to the defense lawyers I have 
interviewed, settlements do not allocate any of the money paid to punitive 
damages. If insurance companies were to attempt to keep track of the 
punitive component of such "compensatory" settlements, they would have 
to rely on the subjective assessment of the responsible insurance 
adjuster. 4 Yet, as the plaintiffs' lawyers report, in practice there is no 
clear dividing line between compensatory and punitive damages. 
Compensatory damages can punish, just as punitive damages can 
compensate. Consequently, the subjective assessments of responsible 
adjusters would be made within such a wide range of theoretically 
acceptable allocations that, in the aggregate, we could have little 
confidence these assessments would accurately capture the pumt1ve 
damages shadow. Closed claim file reviews are unlikely to be more 
1. The research is summarized in Michael Rustad's contribution to this special 
issue. See Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further 
Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 23-24. 
2. See id. at 26 tbl.3. 
3. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the 
Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992). 
4. This is the method used by the Texas Department oflnsurance study reported 
in the article by Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 
1998 WIS. L. REv. 169, 187-201; and in Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, 
The Shadow of Punitives: An Unsuccessful Effort to Bring It into View, 1998 WIS. L. 
REv. 157, 162-63. 
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reliable. 5 Certainly it is possible that closed claim file reviewers would 
be less subject to bias than an adjuster. But any improvement will be 
offset by the closed claim file reviewer's comparatively superficial 
understanding of the claim. 
Whether the product of adjusters or closed claim file reviews, 
quantitative settlement assessments cannot, alone, tell us whether the trial 
verdict studies systematically misstate the impact of punitive damages on 
the tort system. In the event that the settlement assessments produced a 
smaller shadow than would be predicted by extrapolating from trial 
verdict studies, there are at least two contradictory explanations: (1) 
reporting bias by insurance adjusters (what adjuster wants to admit to her 
supervisor, or put anything in the file suggesting, that she paid any 
punitive damages tribute?) or (2) adjusters' unwillingness to pay punitive 
damages in settlement, with the result that cases involving highly culpable 
conduct are more likely to be tried. Similarly, in the event that the 
settlement assessment produced a larger shadow than expected from 
simple extrapolation, there would also be at least two contradictory 
explanations: (1) reporting bias (perhaps resulting from the attention to 
punitive damages within the insurance trade and the media) or (2) 
adjusters' decisions to settle the cases most likely to result in punitive 
damages (and, thus, worth paying some punitive damages "tribute" to 
settle). Even if the punitive damages "shadow" turns out to be about the 
same size as predicted by the trial verdict studies, that result is as likely 
to follow from the canceling out of the contradictory biases and behavior 
of different adjusters (or closed claim file reviewers) as it is to reflect real 
agreement between settlements and verdicts. 
Studies that use aggregate settlement data without undertaking 
individualized file reviews would be even more difficult to interpret. 
Imagine a study that correlated settlement amounts with the presence or 
absence of a punitive damages count in the complaint. Would a result 
that settlement amounts are higher in cases with punitive damages counts 
really tell us very much about the punitive damages shadow? It is to be 
expected that punitive damages claims and higher settlements will be 
closely correlated, but that does not mean that the one causes the other. 
As the research reported in this Article suggests, the far more plausible 
causal connection is between aggravated fault and the settlement amount. 
Punitive damage claims and higher settlements are correlated because both 
follow from aggravated fault on the part of the defendant. The causal 
5. A closed claim file review is a review of insurance company claims files that 
have been closed to determine how the claim was handled . Typically, a closed claim file 
review is based only on the information contained in the file and does not include an 
interview of the adjuster(s) who handled the file. 
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connection between fault and settlement amount cannot be explored 
without individualized assessment of the level of fault in the cases 
analyzed. 
None of this is to say that claims settlements studies-even those 
without individualized case assessments-are a waste of effort. Even 
though the results inevitably would be subject to conflicting 
interpretations, we would benefit from learning how the observed punitive 
damages shadow compares to that predicted by trial verdicts. But we 
cannot expect that such studies will end the political debate. 
This Article highlights an aspect of tort practice that further 
complicates any attempt to measure the impact of punitive damages on the 
U.S. tort system: liability insurance coverage restrictions. Using 
information collected in interviews of South Florida personal injury 
lawyers, this paper describes how insurance law in action transforms 
punishment into compensation, reducing the incidence of payments for 
punitive damages without necessarily reducing the cost of paying liability 
claims. This Article also describes how punitive damages reform 
proposals, such as requiring that a percentage of any punitive damages 
award be paid to the state treasury, create the same incentives and 
opportunities. 
The results suggest two central conclusions. First, there is a core 
punishment aspect of tort law that reformers will find very difficult to 
squeeze out of tort law in action. Second, regardless of the size of the 
punitive damages shadow observed in any study, efforts to reduce the 
impact of punitive damages will have less effect on the out-of-pocket cost 
of the tort system than expected. 6 Instead, what is likely to happen is that 
"punishment" will come increasingly in the guise of "compensation." 
This is not to say that nothing will be squeezed out of the tort system. 
But what will be squeezed out is the historically paradigmatic exemplary 
damages case in which morally reprehensible conduct causes a wrong that 
is far more serious than would be reflected by even the most generous 
assessment of the financial damage to the complaining plaintifC 
Part II of the Article describes how the lawyers were selected and 
interviewed for this study . Part III reports the results of the interviews. 
Part IV addresses the implications of these results for tort and insurance 
law. 
6. I use the qualifier "out-of-pocket cost" to emphasize that the costs of the tort 
system include more than the money paid to plaintiffs and lawyers. The costs of the tort 
system include the uncompensated harm suffered as a result of wrongful acts . For a 
discussion of the relationship between punitive damages and uncompensated harm, see 
Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS . L. REv . 101. 
7 . See Dorsey D. Ellis Jr. , Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive 
Damages , 56 S. CAL. L. REV . 1, 14 (1982). 
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II. RESEARCH M ETHOD 
In the spring and summer of 1996, I conducted in-depth, semi-
structured interviews of thirty personal injury lawyers practicing in South 
Florida. The interviews covered many topics related to personal injury 
practice. One significant area of focus was the lawyers ' experience with , 
and approach to, punitive damages claims. 
The lawyers were identified in snowball fashion : beginning with 
references from University of Miami Law School alumni and radiating 
outward. _ The goal was to interview a cross section of successful personal 
injury lawyers who had been in practice for at least ten years. Twenty-
one of the lawyers presently practice exclusively on the plaintiffs' side; 
six of those practiced on the defense side at the beginning of their legal 
careers . Eight lawyers practice exclusively on the defense side . One 
other defense lawyer presently does some plaintiffs' work, but he appears 
to be moving toward an exclusive insurance defense and coverage 
practice . The larger number of plaintiffs' lawyers interviewed reflects the 
smaller size of plaintiffs' firms and a greater variation in the style of 
plaintiffs' practice. 
The thirty lawyers interviewed were selected from a much larger list 
of lawyers identified by the alumni or in early interviews. Clearly, this 
was not a random sample of personal injury lawyers, but my goal was in-
depth exploration of case selection and litigation strategy, not 
measurement of predefined variables. I am under no illusion that the 
respondents' interview answers provide a thoroughly accurate description 
of what the lawyers do. I interpret the interview records as reflecting 
what lawyers think (or would like to think) they do, which is certainly 
worth considering in the attempt to understand the role of punitive 
damages in tort law in action. 
All but one of the lawyers I spoke to agreed to be interviewed. But 
for this one exception, I was able to obtain an interview with a lawyer in 
every plaintiffs' firm I contacted. There were two high-volume, low-
dollar defense firms that I was unable to contact; the remainder of the 
defense lawyers were as available as the plaintiffs' lawyers. The 
interviews were tape-recorded and, as is customary, I agreed not to 
publish identifying information about any of the lawyers interviewed or, 
absent explicit permission, to identify any of the lawyers to each other. 
(For this reason, the initials used in this paper to identify the lawyers are 
pseudonymous.) 
On the plaintiffs ' side, I interviewed two lawyers in small firms who 
get most of their business from television advertising; four solo 
practitioners (one of whom regularly hires an associate for two years or 
so after law school); seven lawyers in two or three lawyer partnerships ; 
and seven lawyers in firms ranging up to twelve lawyers in size. Cases 
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handled by these lawyers run the entire range of plaintiffs' personal injury 
cases: auto accident, slip and fall, other types of premises liability (e.g., 
inadequate security), products liability, medical and related malpractice 
(e.g., nursing home cases), aviation liability and Jones Act cases arising 
on board ships using Miami's active port. All but one of the plaintiffs' 
lawyers interviewed would handle an auto accident or premises liability 
case, provided it met their criteria for such cases (which varied from 
lawyer to lawyer). Six of the lawyers had active medical malpractice 
files; most of the remainder did not handle any medical malpractice. Two 
of the lawyers had large mass tort portfolios. All of the lawyers had 
handled at least one products liability case, but products liability was a 
significant part of the practice of less than half of the lawyers. 
About half of the plaintiffs' lawyers could be characterized as elite 
members of the plaintiffs' bar. They depend primarily on referrals from 
other lawyers, many of whom are also personal injury specialists. This 
oversampling was deliberate; early interviews made clear that there is an 
active referral hierarchy in South Florida, with the result that many of the 
larger, more complex and expensive claims that are more likely to lead 
to punitive damages are funneled to a relatively small group of lawyers. 
In addition to these lawyers from the "top" of the referral hierarchy, I 
interviewed lawyers who are active in the "bottom" of the specialist 
referral hierarchy (personal injury specialists with a high volume, 
settlement-oriented practice who send many referrals "up") and in the 
"middle" of the hierarchy (many referrals from non-specialists in personal 
injury, some from other specialists both "up" and "down" on the 
hierarchy). 
On the defense side, the lawyers were all in firms of a least four 
lawyers; four were in firms with more than twenty lawyers. All had been 
in practice at least fifteen years, most much longer. None of the lawyers 
had an exclusive relationship with any one insurance company, but most 
derived the bulk of their own work from only two or three companies. 
The larger firms tended to have a broader client base, at least over time, 
than the smaller firms, but this did not appear to be true with respect to 
individual lawyers within the firms. As with the plaintiffs' lawyers, the 
defense lawyers tended to have subspecializations, but, as a group, they 
handled the full range of personal injury work, with the exception of 
small automobile accident cases (which are quite unlikely to involve 
punitive damages claims). With that exception, the defense lawyers 
interviewed were partners in the kinds of firms that defend the cases 
brought by the plaintiffs' lawyers I interviewed. 
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Ill. THE INTERVIEWS 
The interviews addressed several areas of personal injury practice 
that are relevant to the exploration of the punitive damages shadow: the 
nature and fre'quency of the lawyers' experiences with punitive damages 
cases; the role of insurance coverage in shaping liability claims involving 
allegedly aggravated fault; and the way lawyers handle the tension 
between considerations that militate against aggressive pursuit of punitive 
damages claims and the strategic benefits of such claims. 
A. Experience with Punitive Damages Claims 
None of the lawyers interviewed had a steady diet of cases which 
included claims for punitive damages. The closest thing to a steady diet 
was one plaintiffs' lawyer who had handled a series of nursing horne 
maltreatment cases and aggravated drunk driving auto accident cases and 
one defense lawyer who reported having defended at least a hundred cases 
with punitive damages claims (none of which resulted in a punitive 
damages verdict). Many of the plaintiffs' lawyers had a story about a 
successful punitive damages case, but it was often the only one. 
Moreover, that successful case may not have resulted in a punitive 
damages verdict. For these lawyers, success is defined by the dollars 
they collect for their clients, not by the amount that appears on any 
particular line on the verdict form. 
The statement from the plaintiffs' lawyer below is typical: 
Punitive damages I have never focused on because punitive 
damages are an emotional event that in my opinion has little or 
no impact on the legal system. . . . I've been practicing law for 
nearly thirty years and all I've done my entire career is trial 
work-personal injury, wrongful death-and out of the twenty-
nine years that I've been actually practicing, twenty-seven have 
been as a plaintiffs lawyer. I've had one punitive damages 
verdict in that entire time. And I bet I've gone to the jury 
maybe once, twice or three other times. And I have not had ten 
cases in that entire time that have made it to the trial stage with 
punitive damages. There's only been another handful in which 
we've even pled punitive damages. 
-KR 
Some defense lawyers disagreed with the plaintiffs' lawyers on the 
frequency with which punitive damages were pled, especially before 
218 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
Florida's Tort Reform Act of 1986,8 but they all agreed on the rarity of 
punitive damages verdicts in Florida even before the Act: 
I've handled some in which they've been claimed, but I don't 
think I've ever had a punitive damage award against a client. 
You read about them all the time, but there's not that many. 
-YT 
The lawyers would all agree with the statement from the defense 
lawyer with which this Article began: 
I have never had a case that settled and the defendant paid 
punitive damages. I don't think it exists. You go to mediation 
and you just know that you settle the case for the 
compensatories and the punitives get dropped . It's a condition. 
It never settles for punitive damages. 
-EE 
Not one of the lawyers interviewed reported ever settling a case for an 
amount that included a portion identified as "punitive damages." This 
does not mean that punitive damages claims do not have an effect on a 
case, simply that settlements do not allocate any amount to punitive 
damages. Before addressing that effect, however, I want to emphasize 
again what the lawyers emphasized to me: punitive damages issues are 
interesting and intellectually challenging, and large punitive damages 
verdicts draw great attention, but "those highly stylized, exemplary 
damages that we talk about" are not a major feature of personal injury 
litigation. 9 In this regard, Florida is far from unique. Indeed, the trial 
verdict studies report that Florida has a comparatively high rate of 
punitive damages awards, which suggests that punitive damages are even 
less significant to personal injury litigation in most other states. 10 
8. FLA. STAT.§§ 768.72,768.73 (1996). According to the lawyers interviewed, 
the most significant features of the Act are the requirement that "no claim for punitive 
damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record 
or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such 
damages," § 768.72, and the provision that thirty-five percent of any punitive damages 
verdict is payable to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund, see § 768.73(2)(b). 
9. These qualitative results are consistent with the quantitative results of a study 
of Florida punitive damages cases conducted by Aetna Insurance Company in 1986. See 
Koenig, supra note 4, at 178. This does not mean that "punishment" is not a regular 
feature of personal injury practice, but simply that the punishment does not regularly come 
in the form of punitive damages . 
10. See Rustad, supra note 1, at 35 tbl.5. 
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B. Insurance Coverage and Punitive Damages 
When (:lsked to explain why punitive damages were not a more 
significant feature of their practice, the lawyers gave two primary 
explanations. The first explanation is the Florida "manslaughter" 
standard for punitive damages: 
Punitive damages are so rare because the standards are so high. 
-NR 
I can't recall the last time I did a serious punitives case. I think 
that, as a practical matter, punitive damages in negligence 
actions in the State of Florida do not exist. The Supreme Court 
standard is willful and wanton, rising to a level that would 
support a finding of manslaughter. 
-WE 
Understandably, the plaintiffs' lawyers would prefer a different standard, 
but in fact the Florida standard is not higher than that in most other 
states. 11 
The second and more common explanation was insurance coverage. 
In Florida, as in about half of the states, punitive damages awards are not 
insurable for public policy reasons .12 As a result: 
you can't collect punitive damage bucks unless it's against a real 
deep pocket. Hence you don't have a real thrust towards that 
by plaintiffs. They need the compensation more than they need 
11. The prevailing Florida standard comes from the case of White Construction 
Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026 (1984), which held: 
The character of negligence necessary to sustain an award of punitive 
damages must be of a "gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless 
disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous 
effects, or there is that entire want of care which would raise the presumption 
of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wantonness or 
recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the 
public, or that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent 
to an intentional violation of them." 
!d. at 1029 (citation omitted). For a listing of various standards employed by courts, see 
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages 
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1317 n.240 (1993). 
12. See Alan I. Widiss, Liability Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages? 
Discerning Answers to the Conundrum Created by Disputes Involving Conflicting Public 
Policies, Pragmatic Considerations and Political Actions, 39 VILL. L. REV. 455 (1994) 
(a useful review of judicial and legislative regulation of insurance for punitive damages). 
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the ability to say, "You see, I proved you did it on purpose ." 
-TN 
A punitive damages claim against someone without assets is 
worthless. It's a stupid claim. Because you're not going to 
collect it. So, what good is that? Unless it ' s a major company, 
punitive damages just don't do it. 
-NN 
This public policy against insurance for punitive damages has a more 
direct effect in cases in which there is no "real deep pocket." But, a deep 
pocket defendant is highly motivated to manage the case so that the 
insurance company pays. Thus, provided that the limits of insurance are 
high enough for the plaintiffs purpose , insurance coverage considerations 
affect even cases against a defendant with assets. 
Insurance coverage considerations extend beyond the public policy 
restriction against insurance coverage for punitive damages . Indeed, 
many of the kinds of claims that can lead to punitive damages are not 
covered by standard liability insurance policies, 13 as these defense 
lawyers pointed out: 
If you're going to have punitive damages, think about this, nine 
times out of ten it's not going to be something that's covered by 
insurance. Where punitive damages issues come up is under the 
vicarious situation. 14 That's gonna be covered .... but you're 
not going to get a whole lot of cases where there is something 
that's covered by the policy and also a puni situation. 
-DI 
When are punitives ever going to be an issue where there is 
primary liability coverage? For example, if I am being sued 
because I sexually molested a child, and punitives are part of 
that claim, I suspect there's going to be a coverage issue .... 
In most cases it almost rises to the level of intentional tort, 
where the carrier is going to be interested in denying the claim 
to begin with. 
-SD 
13. Standard liability insurance policies exclude coverage for harm that is 
expected or intended from the point of view of the insured. See Widiss, supra note 12, 
at 462 n.20. For a formal discussion of these and other exclusion insurance law issues 
relating to punitive damages issues, see Baker, supra note 6. 
14. The public policy against insurance for punitive damages in Florida and other 
states does not extend to punitive damages that are assessed vicariously. See Baker, supra 
note 6, at 110. 
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Indeed, plaintiffs' lawyers report that asking for punitive damages may 
lead an insurance company to deny the entire claim on the basis of the 
intentional harm exclusion: 
We're running into an insurance company now that is claiming 
that where we claim punitives, the conduct is so bad that they 
are going to deny coverage. 
-PN 
Usually intentional acts will blow the coverage. So, they try to 
say an exclusion applies because it's an intentional act. So 
you've got to be very careful when you're going for willful, 
wanton, when you're going for punitive damages, that by 
getting your proffer in, 15 you're not blowing your coverage. 
-NZ 
You can plead your way right the hell out of coverage and do 
your client no good .... Where you see it corning and you're 
able to get punitive damages and there's a deep pocket, go for 
it. Where there's not, don't destroy the viability of your client 
who needs those damages for life. 
-TN 
Several lawyers also mentioned the statutory requirement that thirty-
five percent of any punitive damages verdict be paid to the State of 
Florida. 16 By making punitive damages less collectible, the "state 
share" creates the same incentive against pleading punitive damages as 
insurance coverage restrictions. Indeed, the state share creates this 
incentive even in the rare "deep pocket" case in which the plaintiffs 
lawyer has decided to ignore insurance coverage considerations. 
C. Shaping Claims to Fit the Coverage Available 
The lawyers reported three complementary strategies for shaping 
claims to fit the coverage available: constructing the claim to maximize 
the responsibility of the defendants with the most insurance; presenting 
the case to minimize the possibility that the insurance company can or 
will deny coverage; and using aggravated fault to produce higher 
compensatory damages. 
15. The "proffer" is a requirement of the Florida Tort Reform Act of 1986. See 
FLA .. STAT. § 768.72 (1996). 
16. See id. § 768.73(2)(b). 
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1. TARGETING THE DEEP POCKET 
The first strategy for shaping claims to fit the coverage available is 
simply a variation on the familiar theme of targeting the deep pocket. 
One defense lawyer described this strategy as follows: 
Tremendous lawyers like [name omitted] will shape their case 
completely to go after the proper party for the proper coverage. 
I had a case with [name omitted] a couple years ago, where my 
client had absolutely no liability. My client also had all of the 
coverage. And what he did was he developed a theme and a 
theory that somehow made my hospital vicariously liable for an 
attending physician on staff. . . . What he did, and it was 
ingenious, and it resulted in me paying him $4 million . . . . 
What he really specialized in that case, or what he really 
focused in on, was creating the wedge between the other 
lawyers and me. 
-SD 
The plaintiffs' lawyers were unapologetic about such tactics. Targeting 
the deep pocket is their job: 
I was taught on my first day of practice there are three things: 
liability, damages, collectibility. I need collectibility first. I 
need damages second . I'm a good lawyer, I'll prove liability. 
-DD 
The plaintiffs lawyer is not unassisted in constructing the case to 
target the best coverage or the deepest pocket. The uninsured (or 
underinsured) defendant helps out. Indeed, a defense lawyer candidly 
reported: 
I mean, you're almost for sale to the highest bidder, because on 
a case like that, the downside is so enormous. I mean we're 
talking about a twelve or fifteen million dollar damage claim 
here with a guy with no insurance. And from the plaintiffs 
standpoint, the plaintiff knows that he's not getting a twelve or 
fifteen million dollar judgement against an uninsured doctor. 
What good does that do him. I mean, he needs to go with some 
theory against the hospital. 
-NM 
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As one plaintiffs' lawyers put it: 
Frankly, for the most part, the ones who are uninsured are 
always trying to look to the hospital. They're going in the same 
direction I am. 
223 
-TN 
These reports concern medical malpractice, but the same opportunities to 
divide and conquer are present in any case in which there is more than 
one possible defendant. 
2. PURSUING THE COVERED CLAIM 
The second strategy for maximizing the available insurance in a case 
of aggravated fault is shaping the case to reduce the possibility that the 
insurance company can or will deny coverage. The most common 
obstacle plaintiffs' lawyers seek to avoid in potential punitive damages 
situations is the intentional harm exclusion: 
If you allege that he intentionally whacked her over the head, 
say with a baseball bat, okay, then the homeowner's policy 
doesn't come into effect. If you say that he negligently and 
carelessly struck her or did something that he shouldn't have 
done, then the homeowners policy comes into effect. So, 
you've got to be very careful about what you allege-what your 
facts are. 
-NN 
Case in point. I had a case where a little boy was playing 
with his friends, and, actually, they were throwing rocks at each 
other. And some man with an antique car was driving by and 
the antique car was hit by some rocks. The little kids were 
playing. He came running out like a madman and beat up the 
kid, roughing him up pretty badly. Broke some bones in his 
body and just overwhelmed him, physically. 
Now, I could have gone in there and said, this is an assault 
and battery case and then have written off all my coverage. Or 
I could say this individual failed to use reasonable care handling 
a civil disorderly matter, and in failing to use reasonable care 
he breached his duty of using common sense in apprehending 
the child and, as a result of that breach, there was damage 
suffered by the child. And I pled a negligence count, and I 
forgot about my intentional tort claim. 
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The carrier started to do a dec. action, 17 but basically, the 
trial court found, when they moved to dismiss my negligence 
claim, that I had properly stated a cause of action and under the 
facts that it was a proper claim. And I don't have to travel 
under an assault and battery claim if I don't want to. I could 
continue traveling under my negligence claim: so they dropped 
the dec. action and defended the negligence claim and ended up 
settling the case, well within the policy limits-there was an 
umbrella with excess of a million-but certainly more than the 
man would have been able to pay by himself. 
-NZ 
Once again, the plaintiffs lawyer is not unassisted in constructing the 
case this way: 
I'm not dealing with intentional torts and when I have what I 
think is an intentional tort, I couch my complaint in negligence 
and hopefully I'll get the same efforts from personal counsel for 
the defendant, the individual defendant or corporate defendant, 
to say we didn't mean it. 
-TN 
The defendant helps the plaintiff because the defendant wants to preserve 
insurance coverage. A personal injury case in which the plaintiff can 
credibly claim aggravated fault is a case in which the defendant is highly 
likely to be found liable. For that defendant the real question is not 
liability, but rather the size of the damages and the availability of 
insurance to pay those damages. 
The defense lawyers readily acknowledge the alignment of interests 
between plaintiffs and defendants with respect to preserving insurance 
17. A "dec. action" is a declaratory judgment action. Unless the coverage 
question can be decided on summary judgment in that declaratory judgement action, 
Florida courts typically stay the declaratory judgment action until the liability action is 
decided. 
The result is that, in most cases, there is no opportunity to conclusively determine 
coverage in advance of the settlement of the liability action. See generally Gregor J. 
Schwinghammer, Jr., Comment, Insurance Litigation in Florida: Declaratory Judgments 
and the Duty to Defend, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 945 (1996). 
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coverage. One defense lawyer reported: 
But then you get into the question of assault and battery 
So what does the plaintiffs lawyer do? He doesn't even 
bother to sue for assault and battery, if he has· any sense. He 
just proceeds on a negligence theory and does not bring the 
assault and battery theory, because there's no coverage for the 
assault and battery and he runs the risk of the jury filling in the 
assault and battery line instead of the negligence line, and how 
does he explain that to his client? He got a hundred thousand 
dollar judgment. Try and collect it. There's no coverage. 
What about the scenario where the suit is just pled in 
negligence and it's not pled as an intentional tort? Now the 
insurance company hires you and you're there defending the 
negligence action. What are you going to do, say it wasn't 
negligence but he did do it intentionally? 
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As the lawyer for the insured defendant, the defense lawyer cannot turn 
on that client and construct the intentional harm case for the insurance 
company. 18 As a result, the defense lawyer and the defendant in effect 
cooperate with the plaintiffs' "underlitigation" strategy. 19 This lawyer 
was describing a situation involving a defendant without assets, but even 
a defendant with assets wants to preserve insurance coverage. Indeed, the 
defendant with assets at risk may be even more motivated to preserve 
coverage than the judgment -proof defendant, because the plaintiffs lawyer 
may well run away from a judgment -proof defendant once the insurance 
company denies coverage. 20 
18. See Parsons v. Continental Nat'! Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976). For 
a discussion of the difficulties insurance defense lawyers face in cases involving conflicts 
between insurance companies and their insureds, see Tom Baker, Liability Insurance 
Conflicts and Defense Lawyers: From Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 
(forthcoming 1998). 
19. For a nuanced discussion of this underlitigation strategy, see EllenS. Pryor, 
The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75 TEX. L. 
REv. 1721 (1997). 
20. Cf. Kent D. Syverud, On the Demand for Liability Insurance, 72 TEX. L. 
REv. 1629 (1994). For a detailed analysis of the conflicting interests of the insurance 
defense lawyer, see Baker, supra note 18. 
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3. TRANSFORMING PUNiSHMENT INTO COMPENSATION 
The third and probably most important strategy, in terms of its dollar 
effect on the tort system, is litigating cases so that the aggravated fault 
produces higher compensatory damages. Here, the lawyers agreed on the 
goal, but reported different approaches to achieving that goal. 
One approach is to present a punitive damages claim to the jury in 
order to emphasize the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct, but then 
to request only nominal punitive damages, in the hope that the jury will 
increase the compensatory damages . A defense lawyer described this 
approach in great detail: 
In many instances where we would want to admit liability, 
we were precluded from doing so because of the claim for 
punitive damages . If we got in a case and we were convinced 
that this was horrible-DUI, no defense, DUI and left the 
scene-well, we would admit liability under those circumstances 
in order to preclude the trier of fact from knowing the facts of 
the case. In a perfect world, the damages should be the same 
regardless of the conduct that caused them. We don't live in a 
perfect world. 
And we know when we evaluate cases, we know that one 
thing we have to take into account is, "Is this a close case of 
liability?" Because, if it is, the jury will compromise the 
damages. Or, "Is this an absolutely clear case of liability?" If 
it is, the jury will escalate the damages. 
So the brighter plaintiffs ' lawyers would use the mechanism 
of punitive damages to enhance the compensatory damages, but 
then when we would come down to final argument, they would 
say, for example, "We're not interested in penalizing this 
gentleman in spite of the fact that his conduct was such that he 
should be penalized, because we recognize that anyone can 
make a mistake, and we don't want to blemish his life forever 
with a punitive damages judgment or a punitive damages verdict 
that is going to follow him and harass him for the rest of his 
life. But, because of the fact that we are willing to compromise 
on this punitive damages issue, we don't want you to take that 
as a compromise on our part with respect to the compensatory 
damages we have asked on the cornpensatories side of the 
ledger" -because the plaintiffs lawyer never gets exactly what 
he asks for , he never does. 
But, in a punitive damages case, he can get it all , because 
of the [following] argument: "Because of the fact that we're 
willing to compromise on this punitive damages issue , and 
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we're not asking for a million dollars in punitive damages, 
which would be the appropriate sanction in this case, we're only 
asking for punitive damages of fifty-thousand, not a million 
dollars," whatever the facts are, "but we 're asking for 
compensatory damages of $758,829.16 and not a dime less." 
The jury says, "Well, that's pretty reasonable. These guys are 
being reasonable ." 
227 
-LD 
Some plaintiffs' lawyers criticized this approach as too risky: 
I know, some people try to keep punitive damages in to raise 
the compensatory damages, but, in my mind, it can do the 
reverse. You can end up having compensatory damages at a 
certain level, and then they go berserk on the punitive and 
punitive damages are not collectible. So , to me, it's a waste of 
time. Too clever by half. 
- NN 
Our concern in the overwhelming number of cases, [because] 
punitive damages are not recoverable, is "Where are you going 
to have the jury dissipate its anger?" Our opinion is that in 
most instances a jury has a figure in mind, and when you have 
a figure in mind, it can come in the guise of compensatory 
damages or in the guise of punitive damages. If they have that 
amount to award in punitive damages, most likely it's going to 
be reduced from compensatories-so you're going to get less. 
-KR 
Still other lawyers described a middle ground-dropping the punitive 
damages claim before the case goes to the jury: 
Put in all the inflammatory stuff you have, then drop your 
punitive damages line. Who needs a million dollar verdict with 
nine-hundred-thousand in punitives you can't collect? This way 
maybe you get your punitives on the compensatory line: five-
hundred-thousand that you can collect. 
-DD 
Regardless of the preferred approach, there was a consensus on two 
crucial points among all the lawyers. First, aggravated fault produces 
aggravated damages , with or without "those highly stylized, exemplary 
damages that we talk about." Second, both plaintiffs' and defense 
lawyers would prefer to see those aggravated damages "in the guise of 
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compensatory damages" rather than "in the guise of punitive damages." 
It would be an exaggeration to say that liability insurance is the only 
reason for this preference . For plaintiffs, the state share, the possibility 
of remittitur or reversal on appeal,21 and tax law22 are all important 
factors, too, as the following report suggests: 
You have a major injury, with major insurance coverage, what 
do you need punitive damages for? You really don't. And 
besides that, you're going to give, what is it-forty percent, I'm 
not sure of the exact percentage-to the State of Florida. To 
me, we don't see much punitive damages .. . . Usually if the 
coverages are there, punitive damages don't matter. Most 
punitive damages awards are knocked down by the courts and 
not kept. . . . Also, punitive damages, the client has to pay 
taxes on. Whereas compensatory damages, if it's a personal 
injury, there's no taxes. 
-NN 
The important point is that all these factors work together to create an 
alignment of interest between defendants and plaintiffs that transforms 
punishment into compensation, especially in the settlement context. 
D. Punitive Damages and Settlements 
As the lawyers reported, there are risks and rewards that accompany 
asserting a punitive damages claim in a Florida case. The risks are that 
thirty-five percent of any punitive damages award is guaranteed not to be 
collectible, because it goes to the state, the remaining sixty-five percent 
may not be collectible, either, because of insurance restrictions, remittitur 
or reversal, and taxes will be owed on whatever is left . Moreover, 
proving the conduct necessary to obtain punitive damages could well 
eliminate insurance coverage for the entire claim. The rewards are the 
(very occasional) punitive damages judgment that is actually collected 
from a deep pocket defendant, and the resulting settlement pressure that 
can be placed on any defendant with some assets to lose. 
When one considers that these risks can be eliminated-and most of 
the benefits obtained-by settlement, it is almost a wonder that any 
punitive damages claim goes to trial. The risks are eliminated by 
21. Studies concerning the fate of punitive damages verdicts are summarized in 
Koenig, supra note 4, at 202-07. 
22. For a discussion of the federal tax law treatment of punitive damages see 
James Serven, The Taxation of Punitive Damages: Horton Lays an Egg?, 72 DENY. U. 
L. REV. 215 (1995) . 
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settlement because the entire settlement is characterized as compensatory 
damages. As a result, the insurance company pays (up to the limits of the 
insurance policy) and the state (and the IRS) gets no share. Of course, 
if the insurance company is unwilling to settle for an amount that reflects . 
the aggravated fault of the defendant, the case goes to trial,23 but that 
presents substantial risks for the insurance company for two reasons. 
First, as defense lawyers are quick to report, plaintiffs' lawyers know 
how to transform punishment into compensation. Thus, the insurance 
company faces a real risk of an elevated compensatory damages verdict. 
Second, there is a strong argument, which has not been tested adequately 
in litigation, that insurance companies have at least some good faith 
obligation to attempt to settle compensatory damages claims to protect 
their insureds from a possible punitive damages verdict. 24 As one 
plaintiffs' lawyer described: 
[I]f there really were a settlement opportunity, if it fails to 
settle, and it could have settled by paying, let's say a hundred 
thousand dollars, and got a complete release for the insured and 
[the insurance company] doesn't do that and the insured gets 
sued and gets hit with a hundred thousand compensatory and 
another hundred thousand punitive, it seems to me that the 
insurance company should pay the consequential damages of the 
bad faith, which would include the punitive award as well. The 
whole two hundred thousand. 
-DN 
The defense lawyers readily acknowledge this risk. Indeed, when 
asked, most of the defense lawyers made an analogy between a potential 
punitive damages verdict and a potential verdict in excess of the 
23. This would not be true in actions against large corporations that control their 
own defense. The defense lawyers reported that their large corporate clients increasingly 
controlled their own defense, whether because of large self-insured retentions, captive 
insurance companies, or by agreement with their insurance carriers. 
24 . See, e.g., Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 
1505-06 (lOth Cir. 1994) (disagreeing with Soto v. State Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222 
(N.Y. 1994) and holding that, although the insurer's duty of good faith "does not include 
settlement or a contribution to settlement by [the insurer] of the uninsurable punitive 
claim," it does require "cooperative efforts by [the insurer] with [the insured] throughout 
to handle and settle the entire case"). But see PPG Indus. v. Transamerica Ins . Co ., 56 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 889, 891 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that "punitive damages awarded against 
an insured in a third party action cannot be passed on to the insurer as consequential 
damages for breach of the duty to reasonably settle"). The research reported in this 
Article suggests that these courts have drawn an artificially clear distinction between 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
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defendant's insurance policy limits. The potential for a verdict in excess 
of the policy limits is well-recognized as obligating insurance companies 
to attempt to settle an appropriate case at the risk of being obligated to 
pay the resulting excess verdict. 25 One defense lawyer made the analogy 
as follows: 
SD: I think it's the same issue. The insurance companies that 
I have in those cases recognize that there's a risk that they're 
exposing their insureds to. 
lnterviewer: By same issue, you mean the same issue as an 
excess verdict possibility? 
SD: Yes. And I recognize that. I keep that in my mind when 
I'm defending the case. You make your recommendation to the 
insurance company pre-trial, or however far along you are in 
the litigation, you say, in your humble opinion the case has a 
settlement value of X and if we go to trial there are verdicts out 
there, for A to Z, including punitives and attorneys fees, and 
they recognize that that's a risk. 
Another defense lawyer stated that he advises insurance companies: 
It isn't your exposure, but it sure as hell is the insured's 
exposure, and if you can get this thing settled for a reasonable 
amount and the insured wants it settled for a reasonable amount. 
Again, from a bad faith situation the exposure you might have 
for failing to make a reasonable settlement of the compensatory 
claim and thereby exposing your client to a punitives exposure 
I think would be taken into consideration by a jury. 
-YT 
Like the risk of a verdict in excess of the policy limits, pumttve 
damages are a wedge issue that plaintiffs' lawyers can and do use to 
divide defendants from their insurance companies. A plaintiffs' lawyer 
described this wedge at length: 
If you have a health plan in Ft. Lauderdale that has a 
million dollars in insurance coverage and they did something 
grossly wrong and as a result of that a pretty little twenty-two-
year-old person who came upon their property and when she 
25 . See Kent Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1112 (1990). 
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leaves the front door of their building she is attacked and raped 
by a criminal, it's a strong negligence, compensatory damages 
liability case, but borderline punitive damages case. Is that 
strong enough for punitive damages in Florida right now under 
the White Construction26 case? Probably not, but by keeping 
it in, and this is where you get into the incestuous position that 
a defense attorney finds himself or herself in-
you have the plaintiffs lawyer who is representing the one 
plaintiff against Corporation A. Aetna hires the attorney. The 
attorney reports to Aetna's adjuster. The attorney might copy 
the president of Corporation A, might stay in communication 
with the president, but he owes his allegiance to Aetna. Aetna 
is the one that sends hundreds and hundreds of files to his firm 
and pays the light bill and the secretary's salary and pays his 
salary. So it becomes really an incestuous relationship, 
especially when you add into it the fact that the plaintiff is now 
seeking punitive damages. 
There's no coverage for punitive damages and you asked 
me earlier. "Do you play that card?" Yeah, I definitely do. 
I play that card because if I can get a sophisticated corporate 
defendant to contact his own private counsel and then have the 
private counsel call me on the phone, I just say to the private 
counsel I think this is a case that is worth in excess of the policy 
limits, or I think this is a case where I am going to get the 
policy limits plus punitive damages. Either way your client, 
Corporation A, is on the hook for big time dollars. You better 
put pressure on Aetna to make a very realistic, bona fide offer 
to settle this case, or else the worse thing in the world is going 
to happen to your client: We're going to go to trial. 
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Because of the uncertainty as to the insurance company's obligation 
to protect the insured from a potential punitive damages verdict, punitive 
damages may be an even stronger wedge than a potential excess verdict. 
One lawyer reported: 
There is an absolute and inherent conflict if punitive damages 
are not covered. There's more of a coincidence of interest 
when limits are low between the insurance lawyer and the 
insured, than on the punitives. Punitives is an absolute wedge. 
Low limits is not quite the same wedge. One reason is that 
26. White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984). 
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everyone can see that the low limits may well lead to a bad faith 
case, whereas the punitives just leads to the insured paying extra 
money out of his pocket. 
-PN 
It is not just plaintiffs' lawyers who use this wedge. Settlement-
minded judges do too: 
Forget the plaintiffs' lawyers playing the punitive damages card, 
the judges will stick in the face of defense attorney the fact that 
they better advise their client that I am considering a punitive 
damages case that may go forward to the jury and the plaintiffs 
might have a very compelling case. 
-DZ 
As a result, defendants with assets to protect engage personal counsel, and 
personal counsel works with plaintiffs counsel to pressure the insurance 
company to settle the case. 
Does this wedge mean that every punitive damages case settles at a 
premium? Clearly not. As one plaintiff's attorney reported: 
The philosophy that we follow, and this is something that I 
teach in CLE, if you just casually throw punitive damages 
claims in the case-assuming that you can get the judge to go 
along with it now, but I said this before we had the statute 
also-you can be creating more problems for yourself than 
helping yourself. The minute that a punitive damages claim 
gets involved in a case, it gets a higher level of scrutiny. If it 
is a corporate defendant, the corporate in-house people are 
going to take a harder look at it. If it is an individual 
defendant, the chances are that they will, if the individual 
doesn't already have private counsel, that they will get private 
counsel. That means . . . you got more difficulties with 
discovery, because you're getting a higher level of scrutiny. It 
also in today's climate, provokes a higher level of scrutiny from 
the judiciary. If the judge gets the idea that you are just 
throwing this in for its shock value and that it's not well thought 
out, you don't clearly have the evidence to support it and that 
sort of thing, you lose credibility in the eyes of the judge. So, 
the decision of whether to include a claim for punitive damages 
or not is something that has to be taken very, very seriously. 
-ET 
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Where there is a realistic claim of aggravated fault, however, 
insurance coverage problems will not prevent the insurance company from 
settling the case at a premium that reflects that aggravated fault. Indeed , 
the defense lawyers stressed this point: 
The insurance company , if there are insured claims that are 
worth five hundred thousand dollars without the punitive 
damages claim, maybe they have to pay six-fifty or seven to 
settle the case . They do it. . . . These insurance companies 
would rather settle that case . I mean, they 're looking at a 
potentially greater compensatory damages award as well. The 
plaintiffs' lawyers don't want a hundred thousand dollar 
compensatory claim and a million dollar punitives claim. They 
want a million dollar compensatory damage claim. 
-NM 
Most companies will tell you that they don ' t cover punitive 
damages and that's not going to affect their consideration of the 
case. But, it'll get settled somewhere along the line . 
-DI 
Are claims involving aggravated fault more likely to settle than other 
claims? That is the kind of question this form of research is poorly suited 
to answer. Nevertheless, it is clear that the answer these lawyers would 
give is an unequivocal "Yes." 
What are your punitive damages cases? Drunk driving. Drunk 
driving cases you are going to try like the dickens to settle, you 
don't want to go to the jury with drunk driving . 
-DI 
It [a punitive damages claim] affects settlement usually because 
the request for settlement takes a long slow route. It starts with 
the defense attorney . The defense attorneys are always 
questioned about whether this is a settlement for their 
convenience, so the insurance company fights . . . . It just 
reverses the drive for settlement. Rather than starting with the 
defense attorney advising the adjuster as to the value of the case 
and working its way to the supervisor and finally sixty days 
before trial somebody in the regional office of the insurance 
company looks at it and then they pass it up the line, punitive 
damages just immediately gets faxed up to the home office of 
whomever the carrier of the doctor or McDonalds or Parke-
Davis or whoever it is and somebody up there in the home 
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office or general counsel starts looking at it and deciding that 
this is something that's gonna be hell to pay in his office if it 
goes bad. So, he starts driving down and insisting from the top 
that the case be settled. It changes the pressure. 
-NY 
I think if you have a viable claim for punitive damages against 
someone, and you're making an offer to settle within the policy 
limits , that really ups the stakes in terms of the adjuster and the 
insurance company disposing of that claim promptly. 
-TN 
If true , would this mean that punitive damages claims cast a longer 
settlement shadow than would be predicted by extrapolation from the trial 
verdict studies? Not necessarily. It would mean that aggravated liability 
casts a long settlement shadow. But to attribute that shadow to punitive 
damages is to suggest that the shadow would go away if punitive damages 
went away. If these interviews are any guide, that seems unlikely. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Punishment can be converted to compensation because lawyers and 
insurance adjusters believe that juries consider the fault of defendants in 
deciding the amount of compensatory damages awarded. Lawyers and 
insurance adjusters believe that aggravated fault produces elevated 
compensatory damages, particularly in the absence of a substantial 
punitive damages award. Without this shared belief, an insurance 
company would have little reason to pay any punitive damages "tribute" 
in a state like Florida, in which punitive damages are not insurable. 
When liability insurance coverage is the most important asset of the 
defendant, insurance coverage restrictions give both parties a strong 
incentive to convert punishment into compensation. When defendants 
have significant other assets, plaintiffs ' insurance-based incentives are 
decreased, but the defendants' incentives are enhanced. 
Other aspects of law also provide plaintiffs with an incentive to 
convert punishment to compensation. The interviews explored the 
incentives created by Florida's state sharing requirement, 27 federal tax 
law, and judicial discretion to reduce or reverse punitive damages awards . 
Another important source of similar incentives, which was not explored 
in the interviews, is the tort law doctrine relieving employers of 
27. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
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respondeat superior liability for some intentional acts of their 
employees . 28 Like the intentional harm exclusion in the standard 
liability insurance policy, this doctrine discourages plaintiffs from alleging 
intentional misconduct. This doctrine will be most important precisely in 
those situations where the insurance incentives are the weakest: deep 
pocket corporate cases. 
Tort reforms would further strengthen the incentive to convert 
punishment to compensation. Punitive damages caps29 make it very 
important for plaintiffs at trial to emphasize compensatory damages. 
Indeed, it is not hard to imagine a trial argument, analogous to that 
reported by LD above,30 to the effect that, because punitive damages are 
limited, the jury should not compromise at all on the compensatories, 
once again, transforming punishment into compensation. 
Publicity proposals of the sort advocated by Professor Curcio in this 
volume are analogous to the statutory requirement in Florida that the state 
receive a share of any punitive damages judgment. 31 Under both reform 
regimes, a punitive damages verdict would cost the defendant more than 
the plaintiff would collect. The result is a strong incentive to settle and 
the transformation of an intended public benefit (publicity) into private 
gain (a larger settlement). 
Settlements give the parties the greatest control over the conversion 
of punishment into compensation. This is not only because a settlement 
can be counted upon to allocate all of the settlement to compensatory 
damages. It is also because the settlement ordinarily terminates the 
insurance company's ability to contest coverage for the claim. 32 
The transformation of punishment into compensation means that 
insurance companies in effect provide insurance for punitive damages 
even in states like Florida, that formally prohibit such insurance. The 
alignment of interests between plaintiffs and defendants means that, except 
in the unusual case in which the plaintiffs' lawyer decides to ignore 
insurance considerations, the only player available to protect the social 
interest in making a highly culpable defendant-rather than the insurance 
28. See generally STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 
§ 4. 51 ( 1983). I am indebted to Steven Ecker for emphasizing the practical importance 
of this tort law doctrine in deep pocket cases. 
29. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, 
a New Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 W!s. L. REV. 387. 
30. See supra pp. 226-27. 
31 . See Andrea A. Curcio, Breaking the Silence: Using a Notification Penalty and 
Other Notification Measures in Punitive Damages Cases, 1998 WIS. L. REv. 343 . 
32 . The exception is when the insured has authority to settle without the insurer's 
consent. See generally, William T. Barker, Settling Without the Insurer's Consent, in 
A.B.A. TORT AND INS. PRACTICE SECTION, LITIGATING THE COVERAGE CLAIM 335 
(1992). 
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company-pay is the insurance company. Procedures that prevent 
insurance companies from obtaining an adjudication of coverage issues in 
advance of the resolution of liability claims inhibit their ability to assert 
that social interest. 
